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Re: [gnso-thickwhoispdp-wg] Dangers and risks of thick Whois
- To: Amr Elsadr <aelsadr@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [gnso-thickwhoispdp-wg] Dangers and risks of thick Whois
- From: Volker Greimann <vgreimann@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2013 18:57:56 +0100
*Data integrity and security:***It is quite true that having more
repositories means that any one is more likely to be penetrated or
altered maliciously. However, that very replication makes it much
less likely that any such change will be un-noticed or unrecoverable.
In the particular cases we are looking for. I am quite comfortable
that Verisign is able to build and support a more robust repository
than many of the smaller registrars.
Not only that, but the registrars obligation to collect, maintain and
escrow this data would not go anywhere. In case of compromise, the data
can easily be rebuilt by reaching out to the registrars.
Also note that there is no replication in thin whois. Every registrar
holds only that bit of data that concerns the domain names registered
through him. Domain names registered through another registrar are not
part of the whois requirements of any other registrar. So basically, you
have to keep thousands of repositories secured, not just one. I also
think a change of a few domains at one registrar is more likely to go
unnoticed than an intrusion at Verisign.
If we posit that Verisign is a better target than a small registrar,
and conceivably they could have a security lapse (which I am *not*
predicting), having a copy of the data at the registrar adds an extra
level of security. If both of them get hacked simultaneously, then
the registrar alone would have been an even easier target.
Agreed, however the data will also be held by the registrar under its
requirements under the RAA. The only changes that will happen is that:
a) The registrar will no longer publish an authoritative whois (and in
my opinion, no longer be required to publish a whois at all)
b) The registry also will hold a copy of the data and publish an
authoritative whois record.
When considering a policy position on data integrity and security
(especially with privacy concerns being my main issue of concern), my
opinion is not based on VeriSign's competencies, but on any registry
for any gTLD with a large number registrations like ".com". Even in
the case of ".com", VeriSign is not the first registry for this
specific TLD, and I don't see how we can guarantee that it will be the
last. So even if we share a sense of confidence in their competence,
we cannot now claim the same for future registries, and would prefer
not to advocate for policy without taking that into consideration.
The privacy issue is another problem. I agree just handing the data to
Verisign will be problematic, however there are ways to handle this in
compliance with data protection requirements.
*Impact on Privacy:* I completely understand the many concerns that
have been raised with Whois with respect to privacy, but I fail to
understand how the transition from a thin to a thick registry impacts
this. *ALL* of the information that we are talking about sending to
the registry is public. Not only is it public and freely accessible,
but it is already replicated in untold repositories around the world,
and particularly in repositories in the country where the registries
in question reside. I agree that if data is sitting on a server in
the US, managed by a US company, that company may be subject to US
law and demands from US law enforcement or governments. But all they
can reveal is information that is already public. Where is the
additional harm?
I completely agree. As the data is already "out there" and registrants
have agreed to its publications through their registration agreements,
the question of who holds it should not increase the potential of
possible harm.
Also, as Whois privacy is provided the same by all sorts of providers
for thick as well as thin registries, anyone interested in keeping their
data private can opt to do so, and thereby safely keep the data out of
the hands of the US provider.
Volker
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