Re: [gnso-vi-feb10] Innovative Proposal

[Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Kathy,

I've written you off-list on several points, now I'd like to address
some points with the list copied.

First, the least disruptive change is an approach I think prudent, not
only because in the very short term the Board acted erratically, and
may continue to do so, but because in the longer term, policy
developments should be gradual, and to some extent, predictable.

Second, the "main model" contains the 15% cap, which is the only
assumption, and a loose assumption, which CORE and its numerous
linguistic and cultural, and some of its regional applicant partners,
found necessary to ensure adequate access to registrants through the
cooperative scheme I'd described elsewhere.

Therefore, whatever else is in the PIR proposal, exceptions, extra
exceptions, and so on, so long as these and the 15% cap on registry
ownership in registrars are equally present, and not mutually
exclusive, we don't care what else is in the proposal.

We (CORE and others inclined to cooperative approaches) will
cooperate, using the 15% cap as a tool to create both access and
competition between registries and between registrars, and those that
seek stand-alone exception-based access to markets will utilize that
tool to create access and competition between registries.

Assuming that the registry ownership of registrars cap of 15%, plus or
minus, and the exceptions and their thresholds, we don't care if the
threshold is 5,000 or 50,000 or 500,000.

You have two choices, more or less, to move your threshold. Less will
make existing and future registrars, like Tom, happy. More will make
others, like Jeff happy.

We are not opposed to community-based applicants having the choice of
joining a shared registrar cooperative, and the choice of not using
registrars until some threshold is passed.

We have no views on the "single registrant" type of application, in
part because it does not exist, though Richard's rhetorical ballet to
prove the non-necessity of any proof of existence was fun, and because
we have no material interest in a single registrant application. We
have given the matter some thought and think that there are several
technical, and policy, criteria for establishing sub-types within a
"single registrant" application type, but it is premature to the
discussion on vertical integration for existing application types.

On the problem of "orphan TLDs", it would be helpful to discuss this
in terms of actual experience, and no only those which were unable to
obtain registrars, but also those there were unable to retain their
original policy. That is, the discussion of "orphan TLDs" could be
quite informed by frank discussion of what didn't work for .pro,
.museum, .aero, .travel, .mobi, and .name.

Lacking from the PIR proposal is revisiting the terrain explored by
the formation of the Afilias registry by CORE and other registrars.

The PIR proposal allows for Registry Xy to create Registrar Xr, within
the exception framework. It does not allow Registrar Yr to create
Registry Yy, again within an exception framework.

Absent the exception, a 15% cap on the ownership of a registry by
registrars would allow a second experiment in the creation of
competitive registry by registrars. The pre-Nairiobi policy contained
no cap, and so the consolidation of Afilias equity to two shareholders
is permitted.

We don't see any particular harm in allowing a symmetric number of
registrars start a registry, and while the equity remains below the
15% cap, allowing those registrars to register domains.

Absent a cap, consolidation could occur, as it has with Afilias,
however, no profound harm appears to have resulted from consolidation
of ownership and control.

In summary, the existence of a 15% cap for registry ownership of
registrars in the PIR proposal is consistent with CORE's proposal of
no change from the pre-Nairobi regime. We don't think that exception
is the better mechanism, for applicants, registrars, intellectual
property interests, ... and ICANN, but those other stakeholders must
comment if their interests are inherently at risk through an exception
to Recommendation 19. We don't think the single registrant portion of
the proposal is ripe, and we think that the proposal would be improved
by admitting repetition of the Afilias experiment of registrars
pooling their capabilities to form registries competitive with the
circa-2000 new gTLDs and the legacy gTLDs.

Eric