Re: [gnso-vi-feb10] Updated MMA proposal now called CAM

[Avri Doria <avri@xxxxxxx>]

Hi,

I think that is something different.  I think that people can decide that the 
competition authorities should interest themselves in what ICANN is doing 
anytime and can alert them to the fact that there is something to be checked 
out.  I personally don't see how strict separation causes market power, so I am 
not sure there is much to see in the case.  

CAM tries to propose a process by which we could be sure that new gTLDs present 
no competition issues, and those that didn't would be enabled for innovation 
but within a regulated system with verification and enforcement.

a.


On 3 Jun 2010, at 18:49, Steve Pinkos wrote:

> Dear Avri and VI WG Colleagues,
> 
> I am not an antitrust or competition law expert, but I'm very interested in 
> the updated CAM proposal which contemplates a review by competition 
> authorities of co-ownership. Following that logic wouldn't it also be the 
> case that some parties may want to seek action from competition authorities 
> if ICANN imposes strict separation, thereby limiting competition by one class 
> of applicant? Perhaps competition authorities will take it upon themselves to 
> review such a policy --- especially in light of a vastly different gTLD 
> market landscape than currently exists?  Can any of the competition law 
> experts help out with this question?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Steve Pinkos
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, May 28, 2010 at 12:35 PM, Avri Doria <avri@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> To fellow members of the VI WG.
> 
> Attached is a copy of the revised MMA proposal. It is now called the 
> “Competition Authority Model” or CAM.  While this proposal builds on the 
> original premise on MMA that evaluations on co-ownership and control must be 
> left to appropriate competition authorities, it also tries to take into 
> account comments and concerns that others in the VIWG have expressed.
> 
> Briefly:
> 
> - We have upped the threshold point to 15% again in deference to the 
> prevailing condition in existing contracts.  This compromise is dependent, 
> however, on the rest of the conditions in the proposal.
> 
> For co-ownership greater then 15% the proposal requires going through two 
> step review:
> 
> 1)  A “quick look” from an ICANN-assembled group, the Competition Evaluation 
> Standing Panel (CESP)similar to the RSTEP standing committee. If they don’t 
> see a problem, the application goes ahead.
> 2)  If the  CSEP flags a problem (based on market power including issues of 
> control) then it is forwarded to the appropriate national competition 
> authorities.
> 
> - Registries and RSPs are allowed to sell through affiliated Registrars so 
> long as specific defined steps to mitigate possible harm are taken.  These 
> steps are required in all cases where selling is done through affiliated 
> Registrars  to also mitigate any possible harm that might be manifest in 
> cases where co-ownership is less than 15%.
> 
> - The proposal continues to allow for SR registrant exceptions from the 
> presumption on the use of ICANN Registrars, though it is open to tightening 
> the conditions for such exemption similar to those suggest by the IPC, but in 
> addition to equivalent exemptions for established NGOs and other 
> noncommercial institutions.
> 
> - The proposal also allows for Community TLDs to provide registry services up 
> to 50,000 second level registrations with an exemption from the presumption 
> of equivalent access to ICANN Registrars.   The proposal, however, requires 
> full equivalent Registrar access for new registrations and for transfers 
> after that level is reached.
> 
> We hope that this proposal is useful in driving the discussion a bit closer 
> to a consensus point.
> 
> Thanks
> 
> a.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>