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RE: [soac-newgtldapsup-wg] Auctions and outcomes

  • To: Krista.Papac@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Subject: RE: [soac-newgtldapsup-wg] Auctions and outcomes
  • From: ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 12:42:06 -0400

> By allowing any applicant to change their string post application
> submission, you are effectually allowing them to pick their desired
> string with visibility. If this were implemented, a supported applicant
> could start with a popular string and work backwards if there are
> multiple applications. 

I've the impression you've just credited me with solving the halting
problem -- picking the parking space closest to the theatre.

I suspect that the "desired string with visibility" reflects more of
the business practices of those who engaged in domain tasting of .com
strings close to famous marks and cognates of keywords than it does
of the problem at hand -- selection of a mnemonic label suitable to
allow users to create a sustainable fee-based namespace with some of
the overhead allocated to a registry operator (the former applicant).

You raise an interesting point when mentioning the percentage of refund
at the point in the process where detection of conflict is possible.

Assuming that the fee is $47,000, the figure recommended by the GAC and
ALAC (but not the GNSO), then under the scenario you've expressed a
preference for, and described as "fair", ICANN benefits $14,100 by
not allowing a supported applicant to select a string not in any
contention set.

Is $14,100 each sufficient to motivate the elimination of all supported
appliaations from the set of strings sought by non-qualifed applicants?

Under the model staff has circulated for several years now, supported
applicants may expect their investment in conflicted strings to yeild
no more than a 30% negative return, while unsupported applicants may
expect their investment in conflicted strings to yeild at most a 50%
equity stake in a merged application, or greater should they choose to
go to auction.

Unchanged, the model is supported applicants at best experience a loss
of $14,100 and no other benefit, and non-supported applicants at best
experience the acquisition of 50% of the equity of a registry contract,
unless they go to auction and obtain 100% of the equity of a registry
contract.

Corrections? I think we're still attempting to find "fair", and "workable".

Eric



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