RE: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm

[Dan Krimm <dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I appreciate this information.  It prompts further questions:

If LEAs do not have this option per se, are there other related potentials
that are not bound in exactly the same manner?

 (1) Do judicial jurisdictions have this authority, and if so could they be
harnessed in this sort of scheme in lieu of LEAs?  This brings the process
even closer to "due process" and the idea of an automatic system can be
applied to reduce bureaucratic delay in whatever jurisdiction it resides.

 (2) Can LEAs "deputize" certain private parties contractually in a way
that is significant enough to bring them into the LEA realm so that they
may receive certain personal data in controlled circumstances?  (Think of
this as a counterpart to the commercial realm where closely-contracted
service providers must operate under a primary business's internal privacy
policy provisions.)  If so, that could become part of a certification
process for private entities.

There is certainly a fairly robust instance of privatization of public
function over the last 20 years, both in the US and elsewhere such as the
EU, and there are regulatory or contractual bindings that produce public
accountability in those instances.

The idea here is a general framework, and a single obstacle is not
necessarily a reason to stop looking for solutions.  I think it's too early
to give it up just yet.

And in the end if we cannot get around this, then maybe the LEAs should
simply take responsibility for all such investigations, anyway.  If they
are not up to the task, then perhaps the responsibility rests with
governments to figure out how to get the task done, since this is a public
trust requiring public accountability.  At the end of the day, there may be
a circle we're trying to square here, and the ultimate solution may indeed
require some legislative action on the part of public governments.  If so,
it seems to me that ICANN should not place itself in a position of trying
to solve their problems unilaterally.

Is it OPTA's position that it has the resources to address all of the cases
of Internet fraud within its jurisdiction on a timely basis (and this would
continue as long as OPTA retains full per-query access to private Whois
data in the OPoC paradigm)?  If so, then there seems to be no need to
involve private parties in the first place.  But there are certainly
representatives of private parties here who would seem to disagree.

Dan



At 9:33 AM +0200 5/29/07, Natris, Wout de wrote:
>All,
>
>I think I mentioned this before, but OPTA is not allowed to pass on
>privacy sensitive information to private persons or institutions. Only
>to other government agencies.
>
>As I have explained I can only speak for OPTA, but I would be very much
>surprised if this would be any different for other LEA's in the
>Netherlands and at least in some other EU countries.
>
>This makes this suggested solution very hard to follow through.
>
>Wout
>
>-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
>Van: owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx]
>Namens Carole Bird
>Verzonden: zaterdag 26 mei 2007 17:44
>Aan: gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>Onderwerp: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm
>
>Hi Eric,
>
>Let me clarify the point as I think I didn't articulate it well.
>
>In one of the email exchanges,  I believe that someone indicated that
>one of the options might be for 3rd parties to request information from
>the WHOIS database from LEAs.  The LEA may not legally be allowed to
>provide the information to the 3rd party - I'm not saying there is
>anything wrong with that ( I agree that it protects privacy, etc ) nor
>am I say the law should be changed.
>
>What I'm saying is that if we are looking at a proposed option based on
>the premise that police or an LEA could act as a conduit for access to
>the information particularly where there may not be a concurrent
>investigation by the police or the LEA, the premise for that option may
>be flawed.  We  may be asking LEAs to do something they simply cannot
>do.
>
>Carole
>
>>>> Hugh Dierker <hdierker2204@xxxxxxxxx> 05/26/07 10:56 AM >>>
>Interesting points here Carole. The first one is just life. And it is
>further the result of each autonomous governments right to secure the
>privacy of its citizens.But the way I understand it, it is the 3rd party
>passing on the info to the LEA that is important. And certainly if it
>first flowed in one direction it can then flow back.
>
>  The second is the same, each country will have to decide what an
>affidavit is. For instance I believe some still require an oath to God.
>Most just want who, what, when, where and how with reasonable
>specificity and an oath that it is true. More often they are called by
>their more descriptive name "declaration".
>
>  Bare Bones is a term I like and should be the standard for recipients.
>Operators of Whois data basis should have a norm minimum requirement
>from here.
>
>  Eric
>
>Carole Bird <Carole.Bird@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>  Hi Dan,
>
>When you say "LEA-operated system" what do you have in mind? My concern
>here is that, as we discussed at the last teleconference, there are
>countries where LEAs are not legally allowed to "pass-on" or distribute
>information from someone else's database unless the LEA is itself
>conducting an investigation into the matter. Even then, the LEA may not
>be able to "pass-on" the information but only use it for it's only
>police investigation.
>
>Also could you clarify what your definition of an Affidavit is? (I don't
>want to assume that it is the same definition everywhere or that the
>elements of an affidavit are the same everywhere.)
>
>Thanks,
>
>Carole.
>
>
>
>>>> Dan Krimm 05/25/07 10:54 PM >>>
>Jeff,
>
>Not sure if I fully understand the question re "institution by
>institution basis" but let me guess -- I would suggest that non-LEA
>query eligibility be certified and verified for individual natural
>persons at appropriate individual institutions for specific "purpose
>domains" appropriate to the individual institution's legitimate need to
>obtain instances of the private Whois information.
>
>And then of course, individual queries from eligible account holders
>would go through the application procedure as described. So to
>reiterate, this is a two-stage process:
>
>(1) Certify/verify individuals' eligibility to make queries through the
>LEA-operated system for certain instances of private Whois information.
>Institutional affiliation will certainly be of some importance here.
>(Review certification periodically, perhaps roughly annually. That
>periodicity is open to comment, IMHO, but I think a one-time cert would
>not be sufficient. Also, when individuals leave positions where
>performing such queries are in their job descriptions, their
>certifications must be removed immediately.)
>
>(2) Case-specific affidavit/application process with well-defined
>approval protocols allowed for eligible accounts in the system, with
>fully individualized audit trail.
>
>
>More detailed criteria need to be defined as to whom would qualify to be
>certified for query eligibility, but I'm not sure that institutions or
>industries as a *category* would necessarily be certified as a group,
>though membership in a group whose members typically satisfy the
>criteria would probably indicate that approval for certification would
>be likely.
>But I would not suggest defining "eligible groups" so much as certify
>"eligible individuals in individual eligible institutions" according to
>specific demonstrated need.
>
>I see no need for institution-*type*-based categorization, as in Susan's
>proposal. I think it would be better to proceed directly from actual
>need-based criteria, and define those needs as clearly as we can.
>
>Frankly, I think the question deserves further exploration.
>Nevertheless, my own instinct is not to create an unnecessary layer of
>potentially spurious categorization that will confuse the accuracy of
>the certification process. Legitimacy should be based on the specific
>use/need, not the "type" of institution, I think. This keeps the process
>closer to "due process" which is the aim here.
>
>Dan
>
>
>
>At 8:58 PM -0500 5/25/07, jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>>Dr. Dierker, Dan and all,
>>
>> I like Dans approach here as it gives third parties what they need
>>while also giving reasonable privacy protection, and anti
>>spaming/reverse phishing.
>>
>> The only part of what Dan is recomending is is what he is proposing on
>
>>a institution by insititution basis or broader, i.e. all whom may
>>apply? Dan, can you clarify that?
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Hugh Dierker
>>Sent: May 25, 2007 7:43 PM
>>To: Dan Krimm , gnso-acc-sgb@xxxxxxxxx
>>Subject: Re: [gnso-acc-sgb] query-screening paradigm
>>
>>Yes it will take some effort to get this set up but it should be
>implemented.
>>The extreme bottom line on this is that it leads an accountability
>>paper trail and then can be checked later if something ontoward happens
>
>>with the data. Of course there is no way to tell for sure in most
>instances.
>>
>>It is important to realize that "you cannot legislate morality" and
>>"any law is made to be broken" With this type of safegaurd I am in
>>favor of third party access.
>>
>>The idea is not to make it impossible, which you cannot do anyway as
>>courts have something to say about it. It is to make access accountable
>
>>and not bulk and safe enough to keep mass abuse from occurring.
>>
>>Dan Krimm wrote:
>>
>>At 12:58 PM -0500 5/25/07, wrote:
>>
>>>I wouldn't be opposed to the idea of some type of "pre-screening"
>>>process for private companies to be able to access the protected data
>>>for anti-fraud efforts, but this would need to be done on a one-time
>>>basis or maybe on some time of bi-annual renewal basis instead of
>>>every time the company has to investigate a fraud. Many of these large
>
>>>companies like Bank of America are the target of a phishing attack
>>>multiple times each day. It's not unusual for them to be working 25-50
>
>>>separate and distinct fraudulent sites in a given day. If they needed
>>>to go through a "screening" process each time, it would be extremely
>>>detrimental to the anti-fraud efforts.
>>
>>
>>Okay, seems that it may be worth putting this idea out there in more
>>detail, at this juncture.
>>
>>What I imagined possibly happening was: (1) a certification process to
>>designate an entity to be eligible to query for private Whois data
>>(i.e., to approve the establishment of a verified account in a system
>>operated by LEAs), and then (2) a case-specific application process to
>>get data for specific queries.
>>
>>As long as the query-screening process is well-defined so that all
>>requirements for approval of the query are known beforehand in an
>>explicit protocol that is available to all certified entities, then I
>>think it need not impose an onerous time cost on the query process.
>>
>>Provide the evidence of wrongdoing (that has to come to one's attention
>
>>somehow, so it should be readily at hand), state the purpose to be
>>confined to addressing that specific wrongdoing, identify an individual
>
>>(a natural
>>person) at the entity who is responsible for use of the data (or
>>perhaps individualize the certified accounts up front) -- something
>>along those lines.
>>
>>If the evidence checks out (i.e., the statement of purpose matches the
>>operative URL(s) in the evidence -- perhaps a domain in the extended
>>header in a forwarded phishing email, or an independent browser
>>retrieval from a pharming URL), then approval could even be essentially
>
>>automatic at the LEAs (perhaps even algorithmically programmable in a
>>SW application without explicit human intervention, providing a report
>>of automatic approvals to the LEAs, as all applications and approved
>>queries through the LEA authority would presumably be fully logged in
>>an audit trail -- this could address Margie's scalability issues).
>>
>>A single query application could designate a request for private Whois
>>data for all domains for a single registrant, if appropriate -- where
>>it makes sense, there need not be a strict single-domain-only
>>constraint, while not extending to full unrestricted access.
>>
>>Then upon approval, the actual private data would be retrieved by the
>>LEA and provided to the private entity as requested (if under the
>>operation of a SW-driven system where the affidavit of purpose can be
>>structured with an input form, this presumably could often be completed
>
>>without human intervention).
>>
>>Bottom line: there are ways this could be streamlined while still
>>providing an initial query-screening step with some substance. Granted,
>
>>this would be distinctly imperfect as compared with strong due process
>>before an independent judiciary (that's why going this far would
>>already be a very significant compromise from the privacy advocacy
>>standpoint) partly because it may be possible to falsify data in a
>>query application (such as providing a falsified phishing email as
>>evidence), but a full and permanent audit trail would provide some
>>additional deterrent on top of that, as any falsification could come
>>back to haunt the individual falsifier personally, as well as the legal
>person s/he represents.
>>
>>That is, in order for post-facto deterrence to be significantly
>>effective, the audit trail has to be robust and independently
>>controlled. That's what the query-screening step would basically be
>>for. If you are following the well-defined protocol, I don't see that
>>this has to be significantly time-consuming. If not, then the
>>post-facto punishment may actually have enough teeth to serve as
>>deterrence that constitutes more than just talk with a little
>nudge-nudge-wink-wink, times being what they are.
>>
>>
>>I would like to ask Bertrand in the case of .fr Afnic Whois that he
>>recently posted to the full WG list, how does access to privately
>>withheld Whois data work? That might provide us with another model in
>>addition to the Dutch Govcert process for comparison. The more working
>>precedents we have to consider, the better.
>>
>>Thanks,
>>Dan
>>
>>
>>Regards,
>>
>>Jeffrey A. Williams
>>Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
>>"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -  Abraham Lincoln
>>
>>"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is
>>very often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
>>
>>"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
>>liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
>>P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
>>United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
>>===============================================================
>>Updated 1/26/04
>>CSO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security IDNS.
>>div. of Information Network Eng. INEG. INC.
>>ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 E-Mail
>>jwkckid1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Registered Email addr with the USPS Contact
>>Number: 214-244-4827
>
>
>
>
>
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