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Re: [gnso-idng] phone question
- To: Avri Doria <avri@xxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [gnso-idng] phone question
- From: Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 03 Dec 2009 11:30:53 -0500
Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
wow, quite a rhetorical presentation.
Glad to be of service.
On 3 Dec 2009, at 01:27, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
Avri Doria wrote:
... I personally would be against giving some special application status to ...
On the call you observed twice that in theory all things are equal. That
interested me.
I would have to check out the recording so see if I really said that 'in theory
all things are equal' . Seems a nice platitude and I hope I did not argue for
it too loudly.
Feel free to correct. I'd the impression you repeatedly questioned the
utility of differentiation, first, between Latin and non-Latin, and
second, between a representation of the concerns of marks owners, the
drivers of the IRT, made by Steve, and the record of DRP instances for
sTLDs, made by myself.
Having made the meta-claim that there is no utility in
differentiation, the next series of questions seemed of natural
interest, assuming that the end is to arrive at a "no disadvantage"
outcome, between the cc and g regimes, or perhaps even their current
operators and associated registrars, registrants, and resolving users,
and that the utility for IDN arises from requirement other than
creating competition for the legacy monopoly operator.
A creating competition rational could eliminate Verisign, but it is
difficult to see how it could eliminate NeuStar and PIR, let alone the
NCBA, MuseDoma, and PuntCat.
I mention this because your concluding "diversity" claim was sweeping
as offered, affecting all existing contract holders who might be
persuaded to offer non-Latin IDNs.
What i think i was arguing (or at least hope) was the same, was that the concerns over adding new TLDS to the root was, or should be, the same for all TLDS, ccTLDs, and new gTLDS whether they have internal champions or not. And that the other overriding concerns, like the one for the protection of IP holders, and maybe even others, should be the same whether the TLDs were IDN or not IDN.
I did admit that the constraints for a 'supported' style of TLD were different
then those for a general style of TLD. But would argue that there was no
intent to give supported style preference in the process. If the GNSO now
wishes to go back on its recommendations and give greater support to the
'supported' style of TLDs, then let it begin that process. Yes, those who like
the supported model have been arguing for its superiority since the beginning,
and perhaps you were right, but that is not the policy that was recommended.
What I do argue is that supported vs general works the same whether IDN or LDH.
What I am saying is that all registries (new and existing) should have the same
chance at time 0 in the application process.
We don't know when "time 0" is, for ICANN's new gTLD program. It may
not be within 2010, or 2011, or ...
We do however know when Chinese will be available in the IANA root, as
it is already in the CN root, and when Arabic Script, and when Indic
Scripts, ...
How do we reconcile a series of known dates and an unknown date, and
the "no disadvantage" position?
I think all have to show they are technically competent - but all do not need
to show they have same high degree of competence Core has unless they want to
run an operations the size and scope of Core.
What utility is there in the rebutable presumption that existing
operators, not merely those under contract with ICANN, but also those
who operate technically similar registries, are not technically competent?
A utility exists in providing employment for KMPG staff, but that may
not be sufficient.
Where else do we look to find a rational to ignore what we know?
I think all have to show they have a viable business plan - but all do not need
to show they have same high degree of business capacity Core has unless they
want to run an operations the size and scope of Core.
See above.
i think all have to show they have a plan to fight malicious use - but all do
not need to show they have same plan Core has ....
See above.
I agree that it is useful to offer a hint to the reviewers that some applicant is
applying for several related TLDS, and asked whether this was not possible in some
"any extra information the evaluators should have' section of the application.
This is a general problem created by the assumption that all
applications are independent, the point of the absurd morning
discussion in Sydney with ICANN's latest external consultant from
KPMG, who could not conceive of any utility for application
interdependency being known to the evaluator.
The design of the most expensive, least efficient, evaluation model is
an interesting challenge, and I think he managed quite well to propose
the most dysfunctional model possible.
We could agree to fix that.
I never said the obverse you are attribution to me:
- never said no existing until a diversity goal is met.
- never said incumbent can't apply until the new have been given a chance.
If you wish to only interact on the level of utterances, then there
are no ideas or issues implied, only the utterances. If so, then this
has been a poor use of time.
But rather did say, or mean to say, that all should have an equal chance to be reviewed against the base level requirements for their application at the beginning of the review process - and that no incumbent be given more of a leg up then they already have by being experienced players in the game or by being Northern institutions with all the advantages that brings.
How does any equity theory amongst applicants for a contract reconcile
with the equity theory amongst contract and non-contract regimes?
Please see the known dates vs unknown date question, above.
I did not suggest an affirmative action plan to support registries from
disadvantaged areas or developing nations (at least not as part of this
discussion) - though I expect there are those who would in the GAC and in the
NCSG and do find it an interesting idea that perhaps should be explore -
especially if we are going to talk about opening up an earlier track for
special applicants. Thank you for bringing it up.
My pleasure. In considering .africa, we've had to consider where it is
technically sensible to site the SRS and front-end function, as well
as the publication function, and it is not as easy as saying "any of
{Amsterdam, Singapore, San Jose, Miami, Reston, ...}". We look at the
submarine cable scheduled build-outs along both coasts of Africa, and
the expected "go-live". I don't have a targeting solution, to quote
from a prior occupation.
The truely pathological cases, which I won't name, are service models,
and some ccTLDs fall within this set, where _no_ functional component
is located within the service area. There are a lot of near
pathological examples, so Southern preference is a best also a
discriminatory exercise, in the sense of selection based upon some
rational tests for discriminating between any two candidates for
preference.
It is easy to say "any of {Rio, Mumbai, Dubai, Capetown, ...}", but
that moves privilege, it doesn't end it.
What I also did not bring up, though perhaps should have, is the concern by
some in developing areas that the Geopolitical Northern registries were going
to grab all of the opportunities for good Southern IDNTLDS and colonialize the
IDN name space before the local populations had a chance to apply in a fair and
open process. It is all well and good that we want to do the right thing for
the future IDN registrants, but some may be suspect of the pure benevolence of
our motives. Why should the rich registries of the North have a chance to
apply for an IDN before the GAC's concern about fees that are prohibitive for
the South can be adequately responded to?
Whether the applicant is a minority linguistic and cultural
preservation volunteer group "in the North", or majority paid group
"in the South", the fee, arising out of (a) the decision that the
incumbent monopoly not bear the costs of creation of a competitive
market, in particular, the application costs of its putative
competitors, and (b) the decision that all applications share fate,
both the fate of payment, the fate of a single expensive evaluation
process, and the fate of a single application window, has profound
anti-diversity consequences.
And, as you note elsewhere, CORE advocated policy as a tool from the
IAHC period to the present. Policy was present in ICANN's "7-10" and
the subsequent sTLD round. The specific consequence of the choice not
to use policy as a tool, the complaint you raise, has been observed
previously.
Eric
a.
Please explain how ...
intentionally failing to distinguish between applicants which presently met all
technical requirements, a more stringent existence, as well as security and
stability test than mere possession of an iso3166-1 associated delegation into
the IANA root, and those which have not met any technical requirements,
and
intentionally failing to distinguish between applicants which presently met all
business requirements, a more stringent existence, as well as continuity test
than mere possession of an iso3166-1 associated delegation into the IANA root,
and those which have not met any business requirements,
and
intentionally failing to distinguish between applicants which seek to obtain
one or more non-Latin Script equivalences to an existing Latin Script entry in
the IANA root, exactly as the ccTLD IDN FT participants are seeking,
and
intentionally failing to distinguish between applicants which have existing
non-Latin IDN registrants, and those which have no registrants,
and
intentionally failing to distinguish between applicants which have existing
abusive registration policies and those which have no registrants,
and
intentionally failing to distinguish between applicants which have no
substantial abusive registrations, and those which have substantial abusive
registrations,
helps arrive at a "is not disadvantaged" position.
While I take the point you made later in the call that diversity is not met by
allocating IDNs to existing registry contract holders, the converse, that no
IDN shall be created until a diversity goal amongst contract holders, or more
weakly, until a N+1 registry contract exists, where N is the number of current
registry contracts (counting .post), places the utility of IDN below the
utility of diversity of contract holders, or the utility of creating an N+1th
contract.
Is this why we have IDNs? To force the N+1th contract? To force the first
contract outside of North America and Europe? I don't think so.
Eric
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