Thank you Andrew McLaughlin for all of your responses, although earlier responses
would have made this process more effective. Fearing that those with more experience
might not be able to respond in time, I've decided to take the initiative and respond.
Cause ("CDT/CC") wrote:
>>2. The underlying goal of this election
>>– to provide
representation to the Internet user
>>community “at large” – must be kept
>>mind when setting the election procedures. Many
constituency groups already have representation
>>on the ICANN board through
the “supporting organization”
>>seats. It is important that the structure
>>procedures for this election be dedicated to ensuring
>>that it achieves
its goal of providing a voice to the
>>general Internet user community.
Andrew McLaughlin ("AM") responded:
>As more fully elaborated below, I think
that this statement reflects
>an erroneous conception. The At Large membership
>processes are intended to ensure that the ICANN Board is reflective
>of and accountable to a general body of Internet users, not limited
any kind of segregation from the other branches of the ICANN tree.
this misconstrues what CDT/CC wrote. CDT/CC did not argue that SO members should
be excluded from this election.
Second, AM writes that "the ICANN Board" -- the
entire ICANN Board, not just the At-Large board members -- should be "accountable
to a general body of Internet users." If the ICANN Board as a whole is to be
accountable to a general body of users, and 9 of 19 members are accountable to only
certain constituencies, then, for a fair balance, should not the remaining members
be more accountable to members outside of those constituencies?
SOs are specialized advisory bodies. Each is open to any
In the case of the DNSO, an interested
>individual can join a constituency, or
a working group, or
>participate in the general assembly. In the case of
the ASO, an
>interested individual can participate in the open policy forums
or at periodic meetings) of one (or more) of the regional
In the case of the PSO, an interested
>individual can participate in the IETF
or another standards
>development organization. A really interested individual
>of free time might decide to participate in all three SOs, and to be
At Large member as well.
Yes, an individual can "participate" (just as anyone with
internet access can participate is this forum), but individuals do not necessarily
have the same ability to vote.
>In other words, there are no hard lines separating
the At Large
>membership from the rest of the ICANN structure. Ideally,
>participants in the ICANN SOs will sign up to be At Large members,
many At Large members will choose to participate in the SOs.
There are many hard
lines in the ICANN structure separating individuals and different types of organizations.
Take a closer look at the structures of the SOs. Can any individual vote for
or appoint someone to the ASO address council? Can an individual join the ccTLD
constituency and vote for ccTLD representatives to the DNSO names council?
I could go on.
>Put another way, there is no rationally tenable distinction that
>be drawn between those involved in the SOs and "Internet users."
Now I can appoint two representatives to the PSO Protocol Council!
SELF-NOMINATION SHOULD BEGIN EARLIER
>>IN ORDER TO CREATE A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
>>FOR ALL CANDIDATES.
>This concern is well-stated, but
seems misplaced to me. I think it
>greatly exaggerates any potential advantages
for the NomCom nominees.
>Given that the process will rely on web-based campaigning
>ICANN website, all candidates will begin to campaign on the same
>Indeed, during the self-nomination process, the candidates for
will have all the focus. Any advantage to the NomCom
>nominees from being
announced early will be more than offset by the
>exclusive attention paid to
self-nomination candidates during the
>month of the self-nomination phase.
start long before the end of the nomination period. NomCom nominees will have
the distinct advantage of extra time to devote to preparation of their web-based
campaign, while those seeking to become member-nominated candidates have to concentrate
their efforts on gaining enough nominations. If money is a factor, NomCom nominees
will have a huge fundraising advantage, similar to being an incumbent.
ICANN has a specific mission: to preserve the stability of
>the Internet's DNS
and IP addressing systems, while privatizing and
>internationalizing the related
policymaking functions. ICANN is not
>a government, nor is it a democracy.
It's a technical coordinating
>body with a specific, limited mandate; as
such, it seeks excellent
>Directors that together broadly reflect the functional
>diversity of the global Internet community.
Though ICANN has
no geographical territory, ICANN is a body much like a "government".
ICANN has oversight in a defined territory or "space" in cyberspace. ICANN's
articles of incorporation, http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm , states that
ICANN shall develop public policies and perform or oversee certain public functions.
Note the use of the word "public" several times, and no mention of "private" or "privatization"
in the 3rd paragraph of the articles of incorporation.
>>3. THE NOMINATIONS
COMMITTEE SHOULD BE REQUIRED
>>TO SELECT SEVERAL CANDIDATES FOR EACH BOARD SEAT.
>I agree with this. You might want to send a note specifically to
Of course, sending a note to NomCom asking
them to volunteer to do something is a poor substitute for the ICANN board REQUIRING
the NomCom to do the same thing.
>>4. SELF-NOMINATION SHOULD BE MADE EASIER
>>REQUIRE A LOWER THRESHOLD OF SUPPORT.
>In general, I'm persuaded
that a lower threshold is a good idea. I
>think the point about August
being a big vacation month is a good one
>too, though I don't think much can
be done about it. The regions are
>of *very* different sizes (members-wise),
so I favor the use of a
>fixed percentage, rather than absolute numbers.
I think 1-2% is too
Isn't this election going to be done electronically?
There is no need for a fixed minimum threshold. It would be an almost trivial
task to program the election site to list nominees in order of number of nominations,
or to allow each voter to choose his or her own threshold for listing candidates.
It's very hard to predict how many nominees there will be and what will be an appropriate
threshold. In the face of uncertainty, flexibility triumphs.
SHOULD BE ABLE TO SUPPORT MORE THAN
>>ONE CANDIDATE FOR SELF-NOMINATION.
is a well-stated point, as usual. But I'm not persuaded. I
that the point of the self-nomination process is to allow
>candidates with appreciable
support open access to the ballot. Given
>that voters will (ultimately)
be able to elect only candidate, it
>seems perfectly rational to me to limit
them to support the one
>candidate they like best for nomination.
issue is inextricably tied up with the threshold for member-nominees. If there
are no firm thresholds, as I suggest, then this issue is less important. However,
if the threshold is even as low as 1-2%, this could be critical. The question
then is not whether it is rational to limit a voter to select only one candidate,
but whether this limitation overly restricts a candidate's ability to win enough
support to pass the threshold.