Re: [gnso-vi-feb10] Group on documenting "harms"

[Antony Van Couvering <avc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Until logic and/or evidence are marshaled, talk about harm are just assertions, 
opinions, and crystal-ball gazing.  Let's prioritize for harms that are 
dangerous AND most likely to occur.   

We should construct policies that deal with likely realities, and minimize the 
amount of far-out what-ifs.  Otherwise we are like the lottery player who is 
transfixed by the size of the jackpot and never considers the odds before 
betting his life savings.  Adam Smith called the lottery "a tax on stupidity" 
and I would hate to conform to that type, especially if those being taxed are 
none other than ourselves.   

"Demonstrated harms" + "known to occur" is greater than "feared harms" + "never 
seen in the wild"

Likewise, "dangerous harms" + "easy to show how it could happen" is greater 
than "the sky will fall" + "I don't know how, but someone will game it."

Let's also remember that from the ICANN perspective, which I think is the one 
we are bound to adopt, harms to consumers rank much higher in the pantheon than 
do harms to competitors in the space.  In this view (which is that of the 
ICANN-sponsored economic studies as well), a monopoly is not bad because it 
advantages one competitor over another, but because it is likely (based on past 
experience) to end up costing the consumer more.  

For instance, it remains to be shown that a registry extracting value from 
high-value names is a consumer harm.  Think about domainers.  Just because they 
don't have an official status at ICANN doesn't mean they're not an important 
part of the ecosystem.   They are, effectively, another middleman between the 
registry and the consumer.   They are not the end consumer.

For high-value names, the chain is NOT:

        Registries -> registrars -> consumers

INSTEAD, high-value names follow this path:

        Registries --> registrars --> domainers --> consumers

I fail to see how the consumer is harmed more by a registry conducting a fair 
and scrutinized sale at market value, than by a domainer interposing himself 
(it's nearly always a him) and acting as a speculative middleman. Either way 
the price will be higher than for a bad name.  There are tremendous benefits of 
having a registry delegate high-value names in a different way than other names 
are sold.  For instance, a name could be sold on a RFP basis, where the winner 
would undertake to develop the name in a beneficial way.  I believe .mobi did 
something similar recently.  

Finally, harms must be balanced against benefits.   Some harms are acceptable 
if there are sufficient countervailing benefits. And public benefits trump 
private harms:  I am harmed when they build a subway under my house, but my 
inconvenience is overweighed by the public good of better transport.

Antony


On Jul 27, 2010, at 5:05 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:

> No disagreement, however some harms can't have happened due to the absence of 
> predicate conditions, and things which could, in theory (by a very elastic 
> definition of "theory") happen, such as a new registry displacing .com in the 
> first small-integer number of years, are less likely than a 
> registry-registrar combine extracting more value out of the first several 
> tens of thousands of domains than out of all subsequent names combined.
> 
> Weighting is useful.
> 
> Eric
> 
> On 7/27/10 7:52 PM, Antony Van Couvering wrote:
>> I propose that in listing out harms we separate:
>> 
>> 1. Known harms (i.e., those that can be shown to have occurred)
>> 2. Theoretical harms (those that are feared but have never actually 
>> happened).
>> 
>> Both may be valid, but things that do happen have a greater reality quotient 
>> than things that might happen, and should be weighted accordingly.
>> 
>> Antony
>> 
>> 
>> On Jul 27, 2010, at 4:30 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> Mikey and Roberto,
>>> 
>>> In the development of a catalog of harms I have a few suggestions.
>>> 
>>> 1. For each posited harm, ask what the necessary information or 
>>> opportunities are, and if the harm is over-specified, that is, a facet of a 
>>> "gem" of exploits of information, opportunity and absence of enforcement, 
>>> and provide pointers to the appropriate literature.
>>> 
>>> E.g., for (land rush) auction systems, what benefits accrue to (registry 
>>> operator) sellers who control some (registrar) bidders?
>>> 
>>> I know there are papers on some of the subjects, for instance quite a few 
>>> in the auction literature.
>>> 
>>> I don't know if there is any utility in asking Staff if any of the 
>>> Registrar compliance experience is available, and the last time I suggested 
>>> using Staff resources (the CRAI SOW and its statement of harms) it was not 
>>> a suggestion that anyone thought useful, but it is possible that Staff has 
>>> some specific experience in economic acts that some Staff think worth 
>>> review for suitability, either as acts to be avoided by policy, or 
>>> illustrative of kinds of acts to be avoided by policy.
>>> 
>>> 2. Use a spreadsheet or a wiki. A bullet list is just a temporary aid de 
>>> memoire.
>>> 
>>> 3. Dump the "potential harms from continued separation" as that is just 
>>> advocacy. Our problem is to find what there are harms in change, not to 
>>> find sufficient harms to motivate change.
>>> 
>>> We have to accept that some will see no "harm", or no compelling harm, in 
>>> separation. Calling it a "harm" means we have treat the "no harms" claims 
>>> from the Free Trade and allied integration advocates as equally 
>>> meaningless. Neither seems particularly useful.
>>> 
>>> There is implied advocacy. It should be avoided.
>>> 
>>> 3. Market power is absent from the bullet list. Some harms are predicated 
>>> upon market power.
>>> 
>>> Eric
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
>