ICANN ICANN Email List Archives

[gnso-irtpd]


<<< Chronological Index >>>    <<< Thread Index >>>

RE: [gnso-irtpd] Example email string

  • To: "'Kevin Erdman'" <krerdman@xxxxxxxx>, Volker Greimann <vgreimann@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Subject: RE: [gnso-irtpd] Example email string
  • From: "Dorrain, Kristine" <kdorrain@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 15:12:29 +0000

Yes, I want to be clear, I am not saying we backtrack and include this in the 
TDRP.  But this type of issue is exactly the one Registrants are seeking a 
remedy for within ICANN.  And we have to tell them, "sorry ICANN has no 
provisions for this."  If a Registrar refuses to say "hey we were defrauded at 
the point of receiving the FOA", then a registrant has no recourse.  The courts 
are not a good solution because of the same jurisdictional hurdles the other 
policies address.

I believe we were going to tell ICANN "hey, we note that this is a problem.  
You might want to create something new to address this because we determined it 
doesn't fit in the TDRP."  My point in sending it was to provide concrete 
evidence of the problem we're recommending ICANN address.

Kristine



-----Original Message-----
From: owner-gnso-irtpd@xxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-gnso-irtpd@xxxxxxxxx] On Behalf 
Of Kevin Erdman
Sent: Thursday, February 06, 2014 9:04 AM
To: Volker Greimann
Cc: rob.golding@xxxxxxxxxxxx; gnso-irtpd@xxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [gnso-irtpd] Example email string


Hi Rob & Volker,

I disagree with the position that a party using illegally obtained credentials 
to effect a transfer is a valid transfer.  In the banking world, if I get Rob's 
banking credentials and transfer $10K to my account in North Korea, I complied 
with the procedures for a "valid transfer" but the transfer is reversible and 
has consequences.  In the domain world, most courts have no power to get a 
domain transferred to North Korea, but ICANN does.  Thus, I think that there 
should be some allowance to hijack victims under ICANN policy to pursue a 
fraudulent transfer that was done according to procedure.  The burden placed 
upon parties that unknowingly participated in the transfer should be minimal, 
but shutting the door on a hijack victim because the hijackers were really good 
and followed procedure seems unfair.
_________________________________
Kevin R Erdman

cell 317.289.3934

Sent from my iPhone

> On Feb 6, 2014, at 5:45, "Volker Greimann" <vgreimann@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi Rob,
> 
> I tend to agree here. A 'valid transfer' is a transfer where transfer policy 
> was followed in performing the transfer. An 'invalid transfer' is a transfer 
> where transfer policy was not followed, or not completely followed.
> 
> A transfer against the will of the registrant may still have been a valid 
> transfer, if process was adhered to.
> 
> Do we need an additional term for such cases?
> 
> Volker
>> 
>>> See the chain of emails from someone desperate for their registrar 
>>> to file a TDRP-the registrar is refusing.
>> 
>> Whilst I sympathise with the Registrant who has 'lost' control of the 
>> domains, the transfers were 'valid' in that they went through the normal 
>> transfer processes, were authorised by the contacts on the domain, and they 
>> were started by correctly logging into the losing registrar.
>> 
>> If the details are exactly as described in the PDF I'd suggest they
>> * first file a report with the police
>> * go see their legal representative
>> * contact the registries concerned
>> * formally write to ICANN (as nothing in there indicated they had 
>> actually raised this with icann)
>> 
>> Rob
> 
> --
> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
> 
> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
> 
> Volker A. Greimann
> - Rechtsabteilung -
> 
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> 
> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net www.domaindiscount24.com / 
> www.BrandShelter.com
> 
> Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan bei Facebook:
> www.facebook.com/KeySystems
> www.twitter.com/key_systems
> 
> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
> Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken Umsatzsteuer ID.: 
> DE211006534
> 
> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
> www.keydrive.lu
> 
> Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen 
> Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder 
> Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese 
> Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per 
> E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
> 
> --------------------------------------------
> 
> Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Volker A. Greimann
> - legal department -
> 
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> 
> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net www.domaindiscount24.com / 
> www.BrandShelter.com
> 
> Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
> www.facebook.com/KeySystems
> www.twitter.com/key_systems
> 
> CEO: Alexander Siffrin
> Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
> 
> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
> www.keydrive.lu
> 
> This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is 
> addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this 
> email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an 
> addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify 
> the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
> 
> 
> 





<<< Chronological Index >>>    <<< Thread Index >>>

Privacy Policy | Terms of Service | Cookies Policy